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The Hendershott ruling
By Eduardo R.C. Capulong & Karen Alley
F
amily law cases with a history of domestic violence can-
not be mediated, the Montana Supreme Court has held.
In a case of first impression, a unanimous Montana
Supreme Court held in April that MCA §40-4-301(2) bars dis-
trict courts in family law proceedings “from authorizing or
continuing mediation of any kind where there is a reason to
suspect emotional, physical, or sexual abuse.”1
The ruling shows great sensitivity
to a problem that has reached crisis
proportions in Montana and the rest
of the country, and it very well may
be the broadest exception to court-
mandated family mediations to date.2
The challenge now is to ensure that
the decision is implemented
statewide. The courts, bar, mediators,
and domestic-violence advocates
must collaborate to create a protocol
and mechanism by which to screen such cases.  This means
outreach and training.
Since mediation is meant to empower parents to freely
design arrangements best suited to their family’s specific needs
– an aim compromised by many, but not all, instances of
domestic abuse – Montana ought to consider a way by which
parties can opt into an alternative dispute-resolution process.
Hendershott v. Westphal involved a Flathead County
District Court’s approval of a parenting plan that included a
mandatory mediation provision.  Heidi Hendershott appealed,
citing MCA §40-4-301(2), which states that:
The Court may not authorize … mediated negotiations if
the court has reason to suspect that one of the parties . . .
has been physically, sexually, or emotionally abused by the
other party.3
Hendershott argued that the District Court had reason to
suspect physical and emotional abuse.  She submitted an affi-
davit stating that she and her children had suffered escalating
incidents of emotional and physical abuse from Jesse
Westphal.4 At trial, two psychologists also testified that
Hendershott exhibited traits of an abused woman.5
The Montana Supreme Court agreed, holding that the
District Court erred as a matter of law for failing to apply
MCA §40-4-301(2).6 The evidence before the District Court
showed enough reason to suspect emotional abuse, the
Supreme Court found.  And as an absolute bar to mediation
given this minimal “reason to suspect” standard – a standard
akin to that which obligates teachers and doctors to investigate
abuse – a district court had no discretion, as here, to specially
tailor a process by which to mitigate such issues.7
The Court also noted a discrepancy between §40-4-301(2)
and MCA §40-4-219, which applies to mediation of parenting
plan amendments, and provides an exception only in cases of
physical abuse; §40-4-301(2) includes emotional as well as
physical abuse.8 Finally, the Court observed that §40-4-301(2)
prohibits the use of alternative dispute resolution generally,
arguably expanding the statute to cover
not only mediation but settlement con-
ferences as well9 – “the hot-button
issue,” Monte Jewell, who represented
Heidi Hendershott, tells us, as many
practitioners insist that settlement con-
ferences are not mediations. That may be
so. But the decision referred not only to
mediation but to “alternative dispute res-
olution,”10 which may include settlement
conferences.  This broader import of Hendershott may impose
a greater task on district courts.   
The decision strikes a welcome balance between the prom-
ise of mediation and the realities of domestic violence. The
court is, more often than not, an inappropriate venue for famil-
ial dispute – hence the routine referral of parenting cases to
mediation.  At the same time, domestic violence often robs
victims of meaningful choice – a fundamental requirement of
mediated agreement.  By recognizing that mediation must be
consensual, that is, free from any physical or emotional coer-
cion attending domestic abuse, the court protects domestic vio-
lence victims and the mediation process.11
BUT THIS IS JUST the first step. There very well may be
instances in which mediation can empower domestic violence
victims. Experts distinguish among four general types of
domestic abuse: 
 Battering situations characterized by coercive control
through violent behavior and other abuse.
 Situations characterized more by a batterer’s weak
impulse control, influenced perhaps by concurrent alcohol or
chemical abuse.
 Situations involving self-defense by the victim.
 Isolated acts of violence that do not allow one party to
coercively control the other. 
Chronic battering situations are clearly inappropriate for
mediation – and these situations are likely what the Legislature
and Supreme Court had in mind in carving out the exception.
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But what about the other situations? Can’t mediation actually
provide an empowering forum for victims under these circum-
stances?
The answer is, of course: it depends.  As a threshold matter,
courts and mediators must be able to distinguish among these
four situations. Cases involving chronic battering are never
appropriate for mediation. As for cases involving poor impulse
control, self-defense, and more isolated acts of violence, dis-
trict courts may need to decide their propriety for mediation ad
hoc.  This means training – for judges, court personnel, media-
tors, attorneys and survivors.  In such instances, appreciating
the complexities of domestic violence and advantages of medi-
ation may call for an opt-in process. 
IT IS NOT CLEAR from Hendershott or the legislative
history of §40-4-301(2) if a survivor can opt-in to mediation.
Under an opt-in provision, a survivor would be able to decide
whether or not to mediate after orientation on the nature of
domestic violence, mediation, and litigation.  Because sur-
vivors are most familiar with their own situations, they ought
to be given the opportunity to choose the forum in which to
assert their claims.12
Several states allow victims to opt in to mediation under
certain circumstances. Those circumstances include cases in
which:
 The survivor voluntarily chooses or proposes mediation.
 There is an available mediator trained in the way domes-
tic violence affects a survivor.
 The survivor has a support person (either an attorney or
a victim’s advocate).
 The mediation is specially structured to ensure the sur-
vivor’s safety.13
Some states also require courts or mediation centers to
adopt a screening protocol.14 Such a protocol is meant to help
courts and mediators evaluate whether domestic violence has
occurred and, if so, of what nature.  Screening protocols also
could help assess whether a survivor is able to mediate or falls
into the category of “battered,” rendering mediation inappro-
priate.  Under these statutes, the screening process is multi-
tiered, requiring both the courts’ staff and the mediator to
screen parties. In such processes, both parties should be care-
fully questioned about whether there is a history of domestic
violence, the extent of the violence, and whether the survivor,
in particular, feels able to communicate with her former part-
ner.  Where the mediator is involved in screening parties, the
mediator can determine how to structure the mediation to best
meet the needs of the survivor, if the survivor chooses to
mediate.  
All states that allow for a survivor to opt-in to mediation
require that the mediator be specially trained to understand the
subtle dynamics at play in domestic violence cases. The medi-
ator must be able to understand the psychological impact of
domestic violence on a survivor, as well as be able to recog-
nize nonverbal cues that the abuser may use to control the vic-
tim.  Further, the mediator needs sufficient training to under-
stand how to balance the power between the parties. 
IF NOTHING ELSE, Hendershott presents us with the
opportunity to educate each other about domestic violence.
How are such cases different from “high-conflict” situations –
so often the paradigm through which courts and mediators
analyze and resolve family disputes?  Which cases should
courts decide and, if so, how?  Beyond the assumption that
courts are better equipped to handle cases of domestic vio-
lence, how are survivors actually treated?  (Here, we need to
assess empirically the oft-idealized nature of litigation.)
Which cases, if any, can mediators handle and, if so, how?
Courts and mediators cannot do this alone.  Advocates not
only need to get involved in screening for domestic violence
cases and training judges, court personnel, attorneys and medi-
ators; they also need to help survivors through any mediation
process through their perspective, resources and support.
Hendershott reaffirms that domestic violence is a matter of
public concern.  As critics have long contended, mediation can
re-privatize this important social problem by its private, infor-
mal, confidential nature. To adequately address domestic vio-
lence and at the same time remain true to the promise of self-
determination through mediation and alternative dispute reso-
lution, we must design and implement systems equal to the let-
ter and spirit of this important ruling. 
EDUARDO CAPULONG is a member of the Bar, associate
professor of Law, and director of the Mediation Clinic at the
University of Montana School of Law. KAREN ALLEY is a
graduating law student and intern at the school’s Mediation
Clinic.
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